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1 Introduction 
Small firms pay higher interest rates, are more likely to be liquidity constrained, and, 
as shown by recent empirical work, suffer disproportionately from reductions in credit 
market fiows in response to economy-wide disturbances. This paper provides a simple 
explanation to these observations in the context of a reputational model relating firm 
age with firm size and access to credit markets. The model predicts that the length 
of the credit history of a firm will be negatively correlated with the interest rate 
it faces and positively correlated to the size of the loans it can get from lenders. 
Credit markets impose limits on the size of new firms. Macroeconomic fiuctuations 
are amplified for new firms through the working of the credit market. 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994) review the available evidence on the cyc1ical 
behavior of small versus large firms in the U.S., and present sorne new evidence. 
They show that credit fiows to smal1 firms contract relative to credit fiows to large 
firms after tight money episodes. After tight money, at the onset of recessions, small 
firms account for a disproportionate share of the decline in manufacturing output. 
This poses the question of why, under those circumstances, small firms seem less able 
to borrow than large firms. Credit market frictions seem a natural place to start 
looking for an answer. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), in particular, point out that 
informational frictions adding to the cost of external finance apply mainly to smaller 
firms, due to the existence of fixed costs in evaluation and monitoring, proportional1y 
greater bankruptcy costs for smal1 borrowers, and proportional1y more col1ateralizable 
net worth for large borrowers. 
The thrust of this paper is that informational frictions may be important for 
small firms because they tend to be relatively new borrowers. We do not consider 
explicitly differential costs in evaluation, monitoring or bankruptcy procedures. We 
do, however, assume that smal1 firms must rely on their reputation in arder to keep 
access to the credit market, and focus on the risk of lending to borrowers with a short 
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track record. 
We support our point of view by developing a model in which firms play an in­
finitely repeated game with adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection 
problems are strong for entrant firms: Among firms which are observationally equiv­
alent, there are many which only have access to excessively risky projects ("bad" 
firms), so that they have a high probability of defaulting. High interest rates (due to 
"lemons" premia over the economy-wide riskIess interest rate) are required to guaran­
tee a competitive return to lenders. If firm owners are patient enough, those of them 
who have access to sound investment projects ("normal" firms) will avoid undertak­
ing excessively risky projects in order to keep their access to the loan market in the 
future. In equilibrium, borrowing limits to firms serve to reduce the gains of choos­
ing excessively risky projects in the presento Borrowing limits are a substitute for 
patience: If the firm owners' discount rate approaches one, credit limitations become 
less restrictive. 
As firms who default are recognized as the bad ones and excluded from future 
lending, firms that stay in the loan market face lower lemons premia. As interest 
rates decline, higher profits provide an incentive for the borrowing firms to keep their 
reputation and, therefore, larger loans are made to individual firms. Thus, newer firms 
pay higher interest rates and are more credit constrained (an therefore, smaller) than 
older firms. 
Macroeconomic disturbances are introduced in the model as movements in the 
riskless interest rateo It is shown that borrowing constraints become tighter for new 
firms when the riskIess interest rate increases. As we ignore multiperiod contracting 
and possibilities of using collateral, we believe our model is best suited to describe 
the evolution of small business' credit terms. l 
There is an extensive literature on the effects of moral hazard in loan contract­
1We can also think of the situation of many developing nations, where the legal environment is 
not reliable enough to allow for multiperiod contracts or the use of collateral. 
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ing at least since Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Our stage game presented is similar to 
their setup. In Stiglitz and Weiss' article, lenders are assumed to be scarce, and 
discrimination among observationally equivalent borrowers emerges to avoid increas­
ing the interest rate, which would exacerbate moral hazard problems. In this paper, 
lenders are not scarce. There is no discrimination among observationally equivalent 
borrowers, but limits on individual borrowing are imposed to counter moral hazard. 
Our model is most related to Diamond (1989) work on reputation acquisition 
by new firms. The adverse selection problem we consider is similar to his. In our 
model, as in Diamond's, the interest rate depends on adverse selection considerations 
(the probability of a firm being bad). Unlike what happens in Diamond's model, 
however, borrowing limits emerge in our model as a result of moral hazard (the 
need to provide incentives for the firms to repay). Other related work on reputation 
acquisition includes Cole, Dow, and English (1995) and Petersen and Rajan (1995). 
Cole, Dow, and English develop a model of sovereign debt with changing types. In 
their model, separation between normal and bad types occur in the first period a 
country becomes normal. Adverse selection stops being a problem, and the model 
relies in trigger strategies in later periods. Petersen and Rajan (1995) focus on small 
business. Unlike us, they assume that adverse selection problems are dispelled after 
the first period, and concentrate on the effects of creditors' market power on credit 
terms. 
Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 derives the equilibrium. In order to 
build an intuition of how the model works, both sections describe the evolution of 
one generation of firms keeping constant the riskless interest rateo Section 4 intro­
duces fiuctuations in the riskless interest rate in a context in which there are many 
generations of firms. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 The madel 
There is an infinite sequence of dates indexed by t = O, 1, .... There are two different 
sets of agents: lenders and borrowers (or firms). AH agents are risk-neutral. 
Lenders survive only one periodo They are born each period with an endowment 
of 1 unit of input. They can lend aH or part of it to firms, and invest the rest in a 
constant-returns-to-scale technology that yields r units of the consumption good at 
the end of the period (Le., they have access to a risk-free return of r). Borrowers are 
relatively scarce as compared to lenders. One interpretation of this setup is that we 
are focusing on a particular industry, so that the economy-wide opportunity cost of 
funds, r, is exogenously given. Another possible interpretation is that we are focusing 
on a smaH economy that faces an internationaHy given, risk-free interest rate r. 
Firms are born at time 0. 2 They are infinitely-lived, and have a discount factor 
{3 E (0,1). The assumption that firms are long-lived but lenders live only one period 
is intended to focus the attention on borrowers' reputation as the link between the 
present and the future. Firms have no endowment, but have access to investment 
projects each periodo Therefore, they must borrow from lenders in order to finance 
investment. 
Firms can operate only one project per periodo There are two types of projects: 
"safe" and "risky." Safe projects have a return of Gy, where y E [0,1] is the amount 
invested. Risky projects obtain By with probability 7f and Owith probability 1 - 7f, 
where 7f E (0,1). 
AHowing y to take any value from Oto 1 is the main departure of our assumptions 
with respect to those in Diamond (1989), where firms are constrained to invest either 
O or 1 (that is, they face fix-size projects). This departure is crucial because, as 
we will see below, contracts between lenders and borrowers will have to specify not 
only the interest rate but also the amount to be lento Of course, our results about 
2In Section 4, it will be assumed that a generation of firms is born in every periodo 
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borrowing constraints are possible because of this feature of loan contracts.3 
It will be assumed that: 
'!rB < r < G < B (Al) 
That is, the expected return of safe projects is larger than the risk-free interest 
rate, while the expected return of risky projects is smaller than the risk-free interest 
rate (It is inefficient to invest in risky projects). The return of the risky project in 
case of a good outcome, however, is superior to the return of a safe project, which, 
as we will see, might provide an incentive for firms to undertake risky projects. 
There are two types of firms: "Normal" firms can choose one of the two types of 
project each period, while "bad" firms have access only to risky projects. Each firm's 
type is private information, as is the type of project chosen by a firm and the realized 
return on a project. 
Lenders can commit to use a liquidation technology that destroys the output of a 
firm if it defaults. The contracts between borrowers and sellers are assumed to be debt 
contracts (Townsend (1979) shows that debt contracts are optimal in single-period 
principal-agent environments with similar information asymmetries). 
At the beginning of each period, each firm offers a debt contract to a lender. A 
contract will be a pair {Rt, Lt}. If the lender accepts it, he will proceed to lend Lt 
units of the input to the firmo Otherwise, if the lender rejects it, the firm will not 
be able to invest. If the loan is made, the firm has to chose an investment project. 
At the end of the period, the firm is expected to repay LtRt units of output. We 
will call Rt the interest rate (contingent on the contract {Rt, Lt}). Firms that do not 
repay their debt will be subject to the liquidation technology, in which case borrowers 
and lenders involved will end up with Ounits of output. If a firm repays its debt, it 
consumes the difference between the project's return (LtYt) and the amount repaid 
(LtRt). Lenders will make use of their storage technology to obtain r units of output 
from whatever units of input have not being lento 
3Another departure is that, to simplify matters, we use an infinite horizon. 
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Within-period timing is shown in Figure 1. We assume that firms are able to 
make take-it-or-Ieave-it offers to convey the idea that they are in the short side of the 
market. 
The population of firms has a fraction p E (0,1) of the normal type, drawn 
once at the beginning of the game. While project choices and realized returns are 
privately known by firms, each firm's history of contract terms and defaults becomes 
common knowledge. At the beginning of time t, the public history of a firm includes 
information about contract terms proposed by the firm, whether they were accepted 
or not and whether the firm repaid its debt or defaulted on it for al1 periods previous 
to t. Let ht be the public history of a firm after it has made a proposal at the 
beginning of time t, and before this proposal has been accepted or rejected by a 
lender. This information al10ws lenders to update their beliefs about a firm's type. 
Let lIS denote by Pt(ht ) the probability, as perceived by lenders, that a firm is 
normal given its public history. The term Pt(ht ) will be cal1ed the reputation of 
the firmo In updating this probability, lenders take into account the distribution over 
possible histories induced by the equilibrium strategies of normal firms and bad firms. 
The reputation of a firm is important because lenders are not interested in lending to 
bad firms: Given (Al), the expected return of lending to bad firms is smal1er than T, 
regardless of contract terms. With complete information, lending to bad firms would 
be avoided. As we will see, reputation plays a crucial role in equilibrium. 
Competitive equilibrium 
We will use the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In the context of our model, 
this mean that for every possible history of a firm (including histories that do not 
occur in equilibrium) we must specify lenders' beliefs over the firm's type. These 
beliefs must be updated according to Bayes' law, wherever possible. Given these 
beliefs, normal firms and bad firms choose actions that are a best response to the 
6 
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lenders' strategy, and vice versa. 
Since bad firms do not want to be identified as such, in equilibrium they offer the 
same contract terms that normal firms do in order to obtain credit (That is, there are 
only pooling equilibria). Moreover, for sorne lending to occur, in equilibrium normal 
firms must undertake safe projects and repay their debts. otherwise, the expected 
return for a lender would be smaller than r. Barring rnixed strategies, that means 
that if a firm ever defaults in a period in which there is lending, it is identified by 
lenders as abad firm and excluded from credit thereafter. Finally, the interest rate 
offered by firms in equilibrium must be such that the expected return for a lender 
is greater than or equal to r, taking into account that normal firms undertake safe 
projects and bad firms risky ones. 
From the possible equilibria satisfying the description above, we will concentrate 
on the one where contract terms maximize the utility of normal firms, and any firm 
offering different contract terms sees its reputation dropping to zero and is excluded 
from credit thereafter. We will call it a competitive equilibrium because it maximizes 
the utility of the agents in the short side of the market. This is by no means the only 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For instance, there is an equilibrium in which there is 
never lending because normal firms are expected to undertake risky projects every 
time they get credit. We believe the equilibrium we propose is the most reasonable 
one in the context of the mode1.4 
The equilibrium path, then, consists of a sequence of loans {Lt}:o and a sequence 
of interest rates {Rt}:'o such that the (expected discounted) utility of normal bor­
rowers is maximized, given that lenders suspend credit to any firm that ever defaults, 
normal firms find it advantageous to undertake safe projects in every period, contract 
terms are such that the expected return for a lender is greater or equal to r in every 
4This is a restriction on beliefs - (of sorts!). In a similar environment (but considering also a type 
of firms committed to undertake safe projects in every period), Diamond (1989) shows that the best 
equilibrium for borrowers survives a variety of refinements that put constraints on out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs. 
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period, and reputation Pt of firms that have never defaulted is updated by Bayes' 
rule. Only bad firms with a zero outcome from their risky project will default in 
equilibrium, because firms who default are subject to the liquidation technology and 
their output is destroyed. 
It is useful to state the following assumption, whose meaning will be clear later: 
r/G-7r (G-r)p? 1 _ 7r and (1 - 7r) 1 _ (3 > 7r (B -	 G) (A2) 
The following Proposition characterizes the equilibrium path: 
Proposition 1 Under the assumptions (Al) and (A2) there is lending along the 
equilibrium path. Lenders only accept contracts from borrowers who have never de­
faulted. Normal firms undertake safe projects. The reputation of firms which have 
never defaulted is updated according to 
Pt+l = 
Pt 
( )	 (1) 
Pt + 7r 1 - Pt 
with Po = p. Jf a firm ever defaults, its reputation drops to zero. The interest rate 
offered by firms which have never defaulted is given by: 
(2) 
_	 00 
Define t as the earliest time such that (1 - 7r)	 ¿ (3r-t (G - Rr ) ? 7r (B - G). Before 
r==t 
t, firms ask for loans given by: 
r'==t 
From t onwards, L t is equal to 1. 
Proofs are provided in the Appendix. The intuition for this result is discussed 
here. Equation (1) follows from the fact that bad firms avoid default with probability 
7r in any given period, while normal firms never default. Equation (2) gives the 
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minimum interest rate such that the expected return of lending to a firm which has
 
never defaulted is equal to r, taking into account the different probabilities of default
 
of normal and bad firms. As time goes on, the reputation of a firm which has never
 
defaulted increases. Interest rates, then, decline over time, approaching r from aboye.
 
Loan sizes are determined in a forward looking manner, taking into account cur­

rent and future interest rates. Borrowing constraints are used to prevent normal firms
 
from considering profitable to chose risky projects.
 
Let us define vt = ¿
00 
(3r-t (G - Rr). vt is the value for a normal firm of under­
r=t
 
taking safe projects from t onwards if there are no borrowing limits (Le., if L r = 1 for
 
7 = t, t + 1, ... ). By undertaking a risky project, a normal firm faces to lose vt with
 
probability (1 - 7r), in case the project goes wrong, and to gain (B - Rt ) - (G - Rt )
 
with probability 7r, in case the project goes well. Since interest rates decline over
 
time, (1 - 7r) vt increases as time goes on. As soon as (1 - 7r) vt becomes larger or
 
equal to 7r (B - G), which happens at time t, borrowing limits become unnecessary.
 
For t - 1 , equation (3) can be rewritten as
 
7r (B - G) Ll- 1 = (1 - 7r) (G - Rl- 1) L l- 1 + (1 - 7r) (3Vf 
This expression tells us that the expected gain of choosing a risky project at t - 1
 
(the LHS) is no larger than (in fact it is equal to) the expected loss (the RHS), taking
 
into account that Lr = 1 for 7 = t, t + 1, ....
 
For t < t - 1 , equation (3) can be rewritten as 
This expression tells us that borrowing limits equalize the expected gain of choos­

ing a risky project (the LHS) with the expected loss (the RHS). Notice that the
 
term (37r (B - G) Lt+1 represents the (discounted) expected loss due to the possibility
 
of being excluded from the market from t + 1 onwards, which is equal, along the
 
equilibrium path, to the expected gain of choosing a risky project at t + 1.
 
The next results follows from Proposition 1: 
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Corollary 2 Under the assumptions (Al) and (A2)J Rt declines over time and ap­
proaches r Irom above. Lt increases over time as long as t < i. 
New firms in need of building a reputation to gain access to loan markets are 
initially finance-constrained and face interest rates with high risk premia. As time 
goes on, the interest rate approaches asymptotically from aboye the default-free com­
petitive rate r. Borrowing constraints loosen, and are no longer binding after sorne 
time i. 
rjG-7r (G-r)Corollary 3 11 either p < or (1 - 7r) --{3 < 7r (B - G)J there is no 1-7r 1­
lending along the equilibrium path. 
The minimum interest rate that guarantees a competitive return to lenders at 
time 0, under the supposition that normal firms do not default, is equal to Ro = 
r . rjG-7r( ). But lf p < , Ro becomes larger than G and normal firms will 
p+7r1-p 1-7r
 
rjG - 7r
 
not be able to repay it. If p < the market does not open because the adverse 
. 1-7r
 
selection problem is too strong: There are simply too many bad firms.
 
G-r 
Let us define Veo - 1 _ {3' If (1 - 7r) Veo < 7r (B - G), the expected loss of 
choosing a risky project would always remain smaller than the expected gain of doing 
so, given that the interest rate is always larger than r. Lending at any particular time 
could only be sustained by an ever increasing sequence of loans, as in a bubble. But 
since L t is bounded by one, this is impossible. The market does not open in this case 
because the moral hazard problem is too strong, even ignoring the initial adverse 
selection problem.5 
Notice that, if we assume Lt E {O, 1}, the market could only open if (1 - 7r) Va ~ 
7r (B - G) (which is a stronger constraint than (1 - 7r) Veo > 7r (B - G)). Borrowing 
constraints permit to overcome this additional restriction, which comes from the 
5In the limit case where (1 - 71") (G - r) = 71" (B - G), the market could open in the absence of 1-f3 
adverse selection, and lending is not discarded by Corollary 2. 
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interaction of adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In a way, borrowing
 
limits do this because they are a substitute for patience.
 
Corollary 4 11 new firms become more patient, borrowing constraints are relaxed and
 
may stop being binding sooner.
 
Increasing f3 increases the possible loss due to undertaking a risky project at any
 
given time t while keeping constant the possible gain.
 
4	 Lending to small firms and macroeconomic fiuc­
tuations
 
The model presented in the previous two sections describes the evolution of a gen­

eration of firms born at time O. In this section it is modified to introduce a new
 
generation of (infinitely-lived) firms born in every period.6 The public history of a
 
firm includes now the date at which the firm was born. Let {Lf, Rf} be the equi­

librium contract terms offered at time t by a firm born at time t' which has never
 
defaulted, and let pf be the reputation at time t of a firm born at time t' which has
 
never defaulted.
 
ClearIy, if aH parameters of the model are kept constant, each generation's history
 
is a mirror image of the history of the generation born at time zero. That is, pf = Pt-t"
 
SimilarIy, {Lf, Rf} = {Lt- t" Rt- t,}, where {Lt- t" Rt- t,} are the equilibrium contract
 
terms offered by the generation born at time zero as described by Proposition 1.
 
Moreover, a cross section of the contract terms offered by firms getting loans in the
 
market looks like the history of the credit terms offered by the generation born at
 
time O. It foHows that:
 
6Since firms are infinitely-lived, the number of firms grows without bound. We can remedy this
 
unpleasant implication by assuming some exogenous, constant probability of a firm exiting each
 
periodo In terms of the model, it is necessary is to redefine (3 as the product of the "true" discount
 
factor with the probability of survival.
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Corollary 5 In the model with many generations of firms, firms from older gen­
erations which have never defaulted face lower interest rates and more relaxed or 
nonbinding borrowing constraints than younger firms. 
Younger firrns are srnaller in the sense that borrowing constraints force thern to 
undertake (safe) projects at a lower scale than older firrns do. It follows frorn Corollary 
4 that srnaller firrns pay larger interest rates. The reason is that older firrns have a 
better established reputation. 
In the frarnework presented, rnacroeconornic fiuctuations can be introduced as 
variations in the exogenously given riskless interest rate r. With the purpose of ana­
lyzing the efIects of an unexpected, ternporary variation in rnacroeconornic conditions 
we will consider in this section that the risk-free interest rate is subject at sorne pe­
riod i to a shock E, which can be either positive or negative. The tirning of events 
is rnodified in the following way: At the beginning of period i, before firrns get to 
ofIer credit terrns to a lender, the value of rE = r + E is revealed to all agents in the 
econorny. For sirnplicity, at any other period rt = r (We do not consider, for instance, 
the possibility of persistence in the shock). 
For the rernainder of this section we will rnake use of the following assurnptions: 
7rB < r + E < G < B (Al') 
p ~ (r + E) IG - 7r and (1 _ 7r) (G -j3r) > 7r (B _ G) (A2')
1-7r 1­
Assurnption (Al') is a translation of Assurnption (Al) to the conditions in period 
i. Assurnption (A2') rnakes sure that the rnarket stays open in period i for firrns that 
have not defaulted previously.
 
We have:
 
Corollary 6 Interest rates paid by younger (and hence, smaller) firms are more 
affected in absolute terms by the shock to the risk-free interest rateo 
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Shocks to the risk-free interest rate raise interest rates paid by different firms in 
the same proportion. Since smaller firms pay higher interest rates, the rates they pay 
also suffer larger movements. 
Corollary 7 A bad shock to the risk-free interest rate (a positive E) results in tighter
 
borrowing limits. Borrowing limits can become binding for some firms that would
 
not be finance constrained in the absence of the shock. Conversely, a good shock
 
to the risk-free interest rate (a negative E) results in less stringent borrowing limits.
 
Borrowing limits can stop being binding for firms that would be finance constrained
 
in the absence of the shock.
 
Since borrowing limits depend on the interest rate paid by a firm, an increase
 
in r will result in more restrictive borrowing limits. A noticeable difference with
 
Proposition 1 is that it is possible for a firm that faces no borrowing constraints at
 
time i - 1 to face them at time i. A bad shock at time i may have raised the level
 
of the interest rate paid for that firm to the extent that borrowing limits have to
 
be reimposed. When fiuctuations in the riskless interest rate are considered, then,
 
borrowing limits have an additional role. In bad times, they serve to make sure the
 
firm has no incentive to undertake risky projects.
 
In spite of the apparent symmetry implied by Corollary 6, good and bad shock
 
do not necessarily have symmetric effects. Let us define E by
 
and € by 
G - r -)(1 - 7l") --- € = 7l" (B - G) . ( 1-,8
 
Corollary 8 If E> E, some firms remain constrained in period i. If E>€, borrowing
 
constraints are imposed upon all firms in period i.
 
Depending on the sizes of positive and negative shocks, it is possible that during
 
good times only sorne firms are freed from borrowing constraints; while during bad
 
13 
-----------------------r---------------,--------------­
5 
times borrowing limits may be imposed upon all firms. This suggests an explanation 
of why the response of small firms to shocks to the interest rate might be dispropor­
tionate during bad times, if all firms in the model are considered to be "small." 
Final remarks 
We have presented a model of reputation acquisition and borrowing constraints to 
new firms. Borrowing limits emerge in equilibrium as a way to provide firms with 
a poor reputation with incentives to repay their debts: Borrowing limits are relaxed 
over time, increasing the value for firms of being able to borrow in the future and thus 
discouraging them from undertaking projects with sorne risk of default in the presento 
As reputation acquisition requires time, newer firms have a poorer reputation and are 
more credit constrained. When the opportunity cost of lending increases, firms with 
poorer reputations suffer the most from higher interest rates. Bad shocks can lead to 
the imposition of borrowing limits to all firms in the model. 
The model is useful to understand sorne observed features of lending to small 
firms, such as the fact that they tend to pay higher interest rates, are more likely to 
be finance constrained, and suffer the most from periods of tight money. Newer firms 
are smaller in the model in the sense that borrowing limits force them to operate 
at a lower scale. All firms in the model are "small" in the sense that they rely on 
their reputation to access the credit market. Introducing investment in the firm's 
capacity could allow to consider more closely the issue of firm's growth. After sorne 
threshold, it could become profitable for lenders to monitor firm's project choices, so 
that adverse selection and moral hazard considerations would loose sorne relevance. 
We leave open the possibility of extending the model along those lines. 
Although the model is highly-stylized, the results are likely to be robust to changes 
in sorne of the specifications. In particular, universal risk neutrality and linear tech­
nologies allow to obtain a neat separation between the determination of interest rates 
14 
and that of borrowing limits. Abandoning risk neutrality and linear technologies 
would only make more difficuIt to disentangle the effects of adverse selection on in­
terest rates and of moral hazard on borrowing limits, without adding much insight. 
It is also interesting to ask what happens if a richer menu of investment projects is 
allowed; for instance, what happens when the project with the highest mean return 
involves sorne risk. In this case, it seems likely to have an equilibrium with excusable 
defauIt. In such an equilibrium, the probability of each firm being a normal borrower 
(its credit rating) will be updated according to its past record of defauIts; in turn, 
credit ratings will affect the interest rates that different borrowers can offer to lenders. 
Too low a credit rating will lead to a permanent exc1usion from the credit market. 
The difference with the model discussed in this paper is that a normal borrower could 
end up being excluded from credit with positive probability. 7 
Finally, it is left open the empirical matter of the relevance of firm's reputation 
vis-a-vis other explanations of the peculiarities of small firms' access to credit markets. 
7Eaton (1990) offers a similar result in a two-period model of international debt. 
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APPENDIX
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
The equilibrium path is the result of maximizing 'L~o (3t Lt (G - Rt ), that is, the 
utility of a normal borrower that chooses safe projects every period, with respect to 
{Lt , Rt}:o under the constraints: 
(i) Rt ~ G, Lt ~ 1 (normal borrowers are able to repay when undertaking safe 
projects), 
(ii) r ~ Rt (Pt + 7l"(1 - Pt)) (it is advantageous for lenders to lend to firms that 
have never defaulted, given that bad borrowers default with probability 1 - 7l" and 
normal borrowers do no default), 
(iii) 'L~t (3T-t LT (G - RT) ~ 7l" (Lt (B - Rt) + 'L':=t+I (3T-t LT(G - RT)) (normal 
borrowers prefer to select a normal project rather than a risky project in any given 
period under the threat of being excluded from future borrowing in case of default), 
and 
(iv) Pt+I = Pt+1T1~-Pt) with Po = P (reputation of firms which have never defaulted 
is updated according to Bayes' rule, taking into account that bad borrowers default 
with probability 1 - 7l" and normal borrowers do no default). 
Increasing Rt does not help to relax the constraint (iii) , so Rt is given by the 
minimum consistent with constraint (ii), as in equation (2). Notice from equations 
(1) and (2) that R t approaches r from aboye. 
With respect to Lt, if (l-7l")'L~t(3T-t(G-RT) ~ 7l"(B-G), then the con­
straint (iii) is satisfied by L T = 1 for T = t, t + 1, ... which clearly maximizes 
'E~o(3tLt (G - Rt) given LT ~ 1 (Constraint (i)). Given that Rt approaches r from 
aboye and (1 - 7l") (G - r) / (1 - (3) > 7l" (B - G) (from assumption (A2)), there is a 
time l such that(1 - 7l") 'E':=t (3T-t (G - RT) ~ 7l" (B - G) from l on. Then, LT takes 
the value of 1 for T = l, t + 1, ... 
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For t < i, the constraint (iii) is binding. From (iii) we get: 
Using (1) to calculate Lt+l and substituting back in Lt we get for t < i - 1: 
1 
Lt = 1r(B _ G) _ (1-1r) (G _ R ) x (31r(B - G) X Lt+1 (11)t

From (1) and Lr = 1 for 'T = i, i + 1, .. , we get for t = i - 1:
 
Li-l = 1r (B _ G) _ (1 ~ 1r) (G _ Ri-l) x {3 (1 - 1r) ~{3r-i (G - Rr) (111) 
Using (111) and (11) recursively we get equation (3).0 
Proof of Corollary 1: 
The evolution of Rt follows directIy from equations (1) and (2).
 
For t < i - 1, from equation (3),
 
Lt+l 1r (B - G) - (1- 1r)(G - Rt)
 
-Lt {31r (B - G) 
But, at t < i - 1, (1- 1r) ¿':'=t{3r-t (G - Rr) < 1r (B - G), which, since the 
interest rate declines over time, implies ~:::; (G - Rt ) < 1r (B - G). This, in turn, 
implies Lt+l/Lt > 1 for t < t- 1. 
Similarly, at t = i - 1, (1 - 1r) ¿~=i-l (3r-(i-l) (G - Rr) < 1r (B - G), which im­
plies (1-1r) (G - Ri-l) +{3 (1 - 1r) ¿~=i {3r-i (G - Rr) < 1r (B - G). Using (111), this 
implies Li-l < 1. Since Lt takes the value of 1 from i onwards, L~i > 1.0 
t-1 
Proof of Corollary 2: 
There can be no lending if p < (r / G -1r) / (1 - 1r) because then there is no interest 
rate that can satisfy simultaneously constraints (i) and (ii) as defined in the Proof of 
Proposition 1. 
Suppose that (1 - 1r) (G - r) / (1 - (3) < 1r (B - G) and there is sorne lending 
at period t. From these assumptions we have that (1 - 1r) ¿'::=t {3r-t (G - Rr) < 
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7f (B - G) for aH t so that constraint (iii) is always binding. Hence, expression (11) is 
valid for aH t. Prom constraint (i) we know that Lt+n :::; 1 for aH t and for n arbitrarily 
large. Then, using expression (I1) we can get: 
t+n-l {37f (B - G) 
L t < g 7f (B - G) - (1 - 7f)(G - R ) (IV) r 
Prom (1 - 7f) (G - r) I (1 -{3) < 7f (B - G) we have that (1- 7f) (G - r) I (1 -{3) = 
7f (B - G) + k for sorne k > o. Then, (1- 7f) (G - Rr ) I (1-{3) < 7f (B - G) + k 
for aH T and so the quotient in expression (IV) is uniformly bounded away from one. 
Then, as n grows large, the RHS must converge to zero and L t must be zero.O 
Proof of Corollary 3: 
Prom equation (3), as {3 increases L t increases. 
Also, as {3 increases, (1 - 7f) L.~t{3r-t (G - Rr) increases for aH t but 7f (B - G) 
remains constant, so it can be the case that the first period at which the expression 
(1 - 7f) L.~t {3r-t (G - Rr) becomes greater than 7f (B - G) comes sooner. O 
Proof of Corollary 4: 
From CoroHary 2, we have that t' < t" implies Rt-t, < Rt- t". Using Rf = Rt- t, 
and Rf' = Rt- t" we get Rf < Rr for aH t 2: t". O 
Proof of Corollary 5: 
After the shock to the riskless interest rate is considered, credit terms for each 
generation are obtained by solving a problem entirely similar to the one described 
in the Proof of Proposition 1, with the exception of constraint (ii) that at time i 
becomes r + E :::; Rf (pf + 7f(1 - pD)· 
The interest rate paid at time i by a generation born at time t' < i becomes 
Rf = t' rt t')' Hence, BRf IBE = (pf + 7f(1 - pDt1• We also have that t' < t" 
Pi +71" l-Pi 
implies pf > pr and BRf IBE < BRf' IBE. (Notice also that B(Rf I Rf') IBE = 0).0 
19 
Proof of Corollary 6: 
As mentioned in the previous Proof, after the shock to the riskless interest rate 
is considered, credit terms for each generation are obtained by solving a problem 
entirely similar to the one described in the Proof of Proposition 1, with the exception 
of constraint (ii) at time i. It is still the case that, if (1- 71") 'L.C:::if3r- t (G - Rn ~ 
71" (B - G), Lf = 1. Otherwise, firms ask for loans given by: 
(1371" (B _ G))i-i-1 00 L~' = -::-------'-----'------'----- X 13 (1 - 71") '" f3r-i (G - R~) 
t i-1 ~ rr (71" (B - G) - (1 - 71") (G - R~,) ) r=t 
r'=i 
Since R}' - ti rt ti)' a bad shock increases Rf. This means that a bad shock 
Pi +rr 1-Pi 
decreases (1 - 71") 'L.~=i f3r-t (G - Rn (making more likely for a firm to be credit 
constrained) and increases the denominator in the expression for Lf (leading to more 
stringent borrowing constraints). A good shock has the opposite effects. O 
Proof of Corollary 7: 
If (1 - 71") (?~; - E) < 71" (B - G), then (1 - 71") 'L.~=t f3r-t (G - Rn < 71" (B - G) 
for aH possible values of R~, so that borrowing constraints are imposed upon aH firms 
after a shock of size E. 
SimilarIy, if (1 - 71") (G - p+;0~p) + 'L.~i+1 f3t (G - Rf)) < 71" (B - G), using R} = 
p+;0~p) we get that firms born at time i remain constrained after the shock.D 
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